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JOHNSON v. DEGRANDY
114 S.Ct. 2647 (1994)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In 1992, a group of Hispanic voters headed by
Miguel DeGrandy brought suit in a United States
District Court in Florida against state officials, in-
duding the Speaker of the Florida House of Repre-
sentatives.' The original complaint alleged that the
districting plan of 1982 violated both the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 19652 in that the districts from
which voters had chosen representatives and sena-
tors were malapportioned, and failed to reflect
changes in the state's population since 1982.3 The
complaint sought redistricting and reapportionment.
The Florida Conference of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
and individual black voters filed a similar suit. The
two suits were subsequently consolidated by the
district court.
Several months after DeGrandy and the
NAACP filed suit, the state legislature adopted Sen-
ate Joint Resolution 2-G (SJR 2-G),4 which once
again reapportioned the districts at issue. In the
districting scheme based on the 1990 census, Florida
was divided into forty single-member Senate voting
districts and one hundred and twenty single-mem-
ber House voting districts. Hispanics were a major-
ity in nine House districts and three Senate districts.5
Both the Hispanic and the black plaintiffs
amended their complaints to allege that SJR 2-G
violated section two of the Voting Rights Act. They
claimed that the new plan "unlawfully fragments
cohesive minority communities and otherwise im-
I When initially filed, the Speaker of the House was
T.K. Wetherell. Bolley Johnson became the new Speaker
by the time the suit reached the Supreme Court.
2Pub. L. 103-94,107 Stat. 1005 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
3 DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. 1550 (N.D. Fla.
1992).
41992 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 3311 (West).
sJohnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S.Ct. 2647,2652 (1994).
6DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 815 ESupp. at 1559.
7Vote dilution is defined as techniques preventing
minorities from gaining access to political power by re-
ducing or nullifying the effects of the votes that minori-
ties cast. See Wasby, Vote Dilution, Minority Voting Rights,
and the Courts 1 (1982).
8The Pensacola issues were settled before trial, leav-
ing only the complaints of Hispanic voters regarding Dade
permissibly submerges their right to vote and to
participate in the electoral process."6 The essence of
the complaints was the plan's failure to maximize
the number of districts where black or Hispanic
voters would be a majority. The Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) filed a similar complaint, alleging that
SJR 2-G diluted the voting strength 7 of blacks and
Hispanics in Miami and Pensacola.8 The district court
consolidated the DOJ's complaint with the other
complaints.
After trial, the district court found that the
plan's provisions for state House districts was in vio-
lation of section two because "more than [SJR 2-
G's] nine Hispanic districts may [have] be[en] drawn
without having or creating a regressive effect upon
black voters." The court imposed a remedial plan
offered by the DeGrandy plaintiffs which created
eleven majority Hispanic House Districts. 0
The court did not change the number of SJR 2-
G's Senate districts, however. Although it found that
a fourth majority Hispanic district could have been
drawn, it would have been at the expense of black
voters." The court was "of two minds", 2 undecided
whether this violated section two without a rem-
edy, or whether it did not violate section two at all.
3
The defendants' motion for reconsideration was
denied.
In an expanded opinion, 4 the district court
found that Dade County, Florida, where Miami is
located, had a "tripartite" political structure with
whites, blacks, and Hispanics voting as separate
blocs.'5 The Hispanic and black blocs were inter-
nally cohesive, and did not cooperate with each
County vote dilution before the Court. See DeGrandy,
1.14 S.Ct. at 2652 n.4.
9 Id. at 2652.
'0DeGrandy, 114 S.Ct. at 2652.
"Id.
'21d. at 2653.
'3 The district court's subsequent opinion explained
that its earlier opinion "should be read as holding that the
Florida Senate plan does not violate section 2 such that a
different remedy must be imposed." Id. at 2653 n.5 (cit-
ing Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. at 1582).
'4 Wetherell, 815 F.Supp. at 1550.
IS DeGrandy, 114 S.Ct. at 2653 (quoting Wetherell,
815 F. Supp. at 1572). "Tripartite" politics is defined as
where "ethnic factors predominate over all others."
other. In other words, there were no "crossover"
votes. The court also found that whites voted as
a bloc to bar minority groups from electing their
chosen candidate, except when minorities were
the majority of voters."; Despite its finding of vote
dilution, the district court decided that the rem-
edies for blacks and Hispanics were mutually ex-
clusive and the "fairest" accommodation was to
keep SJR 2-G.'
7
The DeGrandy plaintiffs and the United States
appealed this decision on grounds that the district
court failed to provide relief for the alleged section
two violation in SJR 2-G's senatorial districts. The
United States Supreme Court stayed judgment and
noted probable jurisdiction.
HOLDING
The Supreme' Court held that the district
court misapplied the "totality of circumstances"
test for vote dilution, resulting in a misreading of
the governing law from Thornburg v. Gingles.'8 It
further held that there was no violation of sec-
tion two of the Voting Rights Act in the House
districts because minority voters formed effective
voting majorities in a percentage of House dis-
tricts roughly proportional 19 to their percentage
share of the voting-age population in Dade
County.20 In other words, the failure to maximize
the voting strength of the minority population
did not violate section two of the Voting Rights
16DeGrandy, 114 S.Ct. at 2653.
17 Id.
'8478 U.S. 30 (1986); DeGrandy, 114 S.Ct. at 2662.
19 "Proportionality" is defined here as the number of
majority-minority voting districts compared to the mi-
nority members' share of the voting-age population. Id.
at 2658 n.11.
2'Id. at 2658-2659.
211d. at 2659.
2 Id. at 2663.
23The record shows that out of the 20 House dis-
tricts in part of Dade County, Hispanics would make an
effective voting majority in 45% of them. "Effective" ma-
jority is defined as 60-65%. This percentage accounts for
the lower voter turnout, registration, and younger me-
dian Hispanic population. Hispanics constitute 47% of
the voting age population in that area. DeGrandy, 114
S.Ct. at 2658 (citing Wetherell, 815 FSupp. at 1580-82).
24 478 U.S. 30 (1986). The Gingles conditions nar-
rowed the interpretation of the factors stated in the Sen-
ate Report of the 1982 amendments. The factors outlined
in the report include: (1) the history ofvoting-related dis-
crimination in the state or political subdivision; (2) the
Act.2' Regarding the senatorial districts, the Su-
preme Court held that although the district court
again misapplied the governing law, it correctly
left the state's plan undisturbed.?
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
I. The Gingles Test
The state defendants argued that the district
court misapplied Supreme Court precedent to re-
quire the maximum number of minority-voter dis-
tricts even when, as in this case, the number of dis-
tricts is in proportion to the area's minority voting-
age population.23 The state argued that this propor-
tionality bars a finding of vote dilution.
Analyzing the state's claim, the Court retraced
the requirements to prove vote dilution. Using the
test first stated in Ginges,24 the Court cited the three
conditions that must be met for a dilution challenge:
-1) a minority group must be sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in
a single-member district; 2) the group is politically
cohesive; 3) the white majority votes sufficiently as
a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate s
The first condition was assumed to have been
met in spite of the factual dispute of whether the
correct characteristic of the Hispanic population is
age or citizenship.2 6 The state contended that half
of the voting-age Hispanics were not citizens, and
thus were not eligible to vote. Therefore, the lower
extent to which voting is racially polarized; (3) the ex-
tent to which the state or political subdivision has used
discriminatory voting practices or procedures; (4) the ex-
tent to which minorities bear the effects of discrimina-
tion in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process; (5) whether past political campaigns have
been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; (6)
the extent to which members of the minority group have
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Further-
more, probative evidence includes the elected officials'
unresponsiveness to the minority group's needs, and tenu-
ous policy underlying the state or political subdivision's
use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice or procedure. S. Rep. No. 417, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 27-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.S.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
2s Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51. White majority bloc
voting may be considered a more significant indicator of
vote polarization than minority bloc voting because of its
effect in shutting out the minority. Wasby, supra note 7,
at8.
26DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2655.
number of actual voting-age Hispanic citizens do
not warrant a change in the state's plan.27 The Court
dismissed this argument as unnecessary to resolve 
28
It agreed with the district court and found that the
Hispanic minority met all three Ginges conditions.29
U. Totality of Circumstances
The Gingles factors are a necessary precondi-
tion to prove a section two claim, but are insuffi-
cient in and of themselves. The totality of circum-
stances must also be examined, as required by sec-
tion 2( b) of the Voting Rights Act, which states that
"a denial or abridgment occurs where, based on the
totality of circumstances ... [members of a protected
class] have less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice."30
The Court noted that proof of vote dilution may
become more difficult in a case like this, where the
issue is "not the chance for some electoral success in
place of none, but a chance for more success in place
of some."' In other words, the DeGrandy plaintiffs
were not alleging dilution because of an absence of
Hispanic majority districts, but rather because it
would have been possible to create more.
In finding vote dilution, the Court held that the
district court misjudged the "totality of circum-
stances."32 In spite of meeting the Gingles conditions
for vote dilution, SJR 2-G provided minority repre-
sentation proportional to the minority voting-age
population. With the plan, Hispanic voters had an
equal measure of political and electoral opportunity.
The Court held that SJR 2-G would end discrimi-
nation, not perpetuate it.
33
The plaintiffs wanted more weight to be placed
on the district court findings of packing, (placing a
large number of minority voters in one district so
that there are few minority voters in other districts),
and fragmenting, (distributing a small number of
27 1d.
28Id. at 2656.
29The second condition, political cohesion, was found
among Hispanic and black minorities. Political immigrants
- Cubans, Nicaraguans, and other Central Americans -
formed a conservative coalition. Puerto Ricans and Do-
minicans, while less conservative, identified more with the
language minorities than with blacks. Blacks were found
to be heavily Democratic; ninety percent were registered
Democrats.The district court also found that whites voted
as a bloc. Substantial testimony concluded that three dis-
tinct and separate ethnic groups existed in Dade County,
each with different social and economic interests. Accord-
ing to expert testimony, minorities were usually only able
minorities in several districts to limit their influ-
ence).34 The districting plan divided the same hous-
ing development, heavily populated by Hispanics,
into two districts. Consequently, one district packed
Hispanic voters, while two others fragmented
them.
35
In response, the Court stated that "some di-
viding by district lines and combining within them
is virtually inevitable and befalls any population
group of substantial size. Attaching the labels
'packing' and 'fragmenting' to these phenomena,
without more, does not make the result vote di-
lution when the minority group enjoys substan-
tial proportionality."36
III. Maximization of Districts
The Court reasoned that the district court
placed insufficient weight on proportionality in the
House and Senate districts, and apparently adopted
a rule of thumb that anything short of the maxi-
mum number of majority-minority districts violated
section two.37 Such a reading "tends to obscure the
very object of the statute and runs counter to its
textually stated purpose"
In the five Senate districts wholly within Dade
County, the percentage of the voting age minority
population was proportional to the percentage of
majority-minority districts. 38 The voting age popu-
lation of Hispanics was approximately fifty-four
percent, while sixty percent of the districts had an
effective Hispanic majority. For blacks, the voting
age population was 13.5%; twenty percent of the
districts had a black majority.
39
Moreover, the Senate plan achieved near pro-
portionality even including the area surrounding
Dade County.40 As with the House districts, the
Court concluded that there was no violation of sec-
tion two considering the totality of circumstances.
4
In the Court's view, "one may suspect dilution from
political famine, but one is not entitled to suspect
to elect candidates of their choice when they were firmly
in the majority. WehereU, 815 F. Supp. at 1572.
3042 U.S.C. § 1973(b).31DeGrandy, 114 S.Ct. at 2658.
3Zld.
331d. at 2658-2659.
341d. at 2659.
3S1d.
36Id. at 2659.
371d.
381d. at 2663 n.19.
39
1d.
401d. at 2663.
41Jd.
dilution from mere failure to guarantee a political
feast."
42
IV. Safe Harbor Provision
Although the Court rejected maximization of
districts, it also rejected the state's position that no
dilution occurs whenever the percentage of single-
member districts in which minority voters form an
effective majority mirrors the minority's percent-
age of relevant population,43 the so-called "safe-har-
bor" of proportionality."
First, it found that the "safe harbor" provision
violated the statutory requirement for assessment
of the totality of circumstances, 4 as well as the con-
sidered purpose and ideal of the Voting Rights Act.
46
Totality review is necessary because of the ingenu-
ous devices that may be employed by state and lo-
cal governments to subvert section two even where
proportionality exiit.
47
Secondly, even restricting safe harbor to cases
of redistricting dilution runs the risk of allowing
gerrymandering so long as the overall outcome is
proportional.48 Thus, some minorities' rights could
be traded off against others.49 Moreover, a safe har-
bor rule could "promote and perpetuate efforts to
devise majority-minority districts even in circum-
stances where they may not be necessary to achieve
equal political and electoral opportunity."s° Thus,
proportionality is to be used only as evidence in the
assessment of section two claims.
In addition to the majority's opinion, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy offered concurring opinions.
Justice O'Connor's opinion stressed that proportion-
ality is always relevant evidence, but is never itself
dispositive5s In other words, the absence of propor-
tionality does not prove dilution, just as its pres-
ence does not prove non-dilution.
Justice Kennedy not only agreed that section two
does not require maximization of majority-minor-
ity districts, but rejects remedial districting entirely.
Moreover, he wrote, sorting persons by race "raises
4 2 Id. at 2660.
4 The parties were in dispute about whether the rel-
evant population in the case was the minority group's share
of the population, or the percentage of minorities actu-
ally eligible to vote. Id. at 2660 n.14.
44 Id. at 2660.
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
46 See Prosser v. Elections Board, 793 F.Supp. 859, 870
(W.D. Wis. 1992) (goal of the Voting Rights Act is to en-
hance the electoral power of minority voters).
47 See McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 243-246
(1984).
48Degrandy, 114 $.Ct. at 2660.
the most serious constitutional questions", s2 and
"takes us further away from the goal of a political
system in which race no longer matters."s
Lastly, Justices Thomas and Scalia joined in a
dissent which would have dismissed the cases for
failure to state a claim under section two.s
CONCLUSION
The majority's decision may be considered a
compromise. Proportionality is not dispositive only
evidentiary. However, the decision brings with it
questions about the future of section two claims.
Applying the maximization principle in this case
may have been inappropriate, but questions arise
when only one minority group is involved. What
the decision apparently holds is that even when an-
other minority group's interests are not at stake, the
state is not obliged to create the maximum number
of majority-minority districts.
However, in practice, the Court's treatment of
proportionality is confusing. While it states that pro-
portionality is not dispositive, the fact that the His-
panic districts were in proportion to the Hispanic
population was the major factor in the decision. Al-
though the Court dismissed the state-proposed safe
harbor rule, it seems to have adopted it. The Court
warned that such a rule would allow insidious tac-
tics of discrimination to continue if proportionality
was the end result. Nevertheless, allegations of the
"fragmenting" and "packing" of a Hispanic housing
project were discounted as mere "recitations of tes-
timony."55 Given this response by the Court, it is
difficult to imagine when the Court would find a
violation of section two when proportionality ex-
ists. Those persons challenging a districting scheme
that is proportional to the minority population will
find it a difficult case to win.
Moreover, the Kennedy concurrence may be a
precursor to even tougher times for section two
claims. Kennedy not only rejects maximization, but
491d. at 2661.
501d.
11 Id. at 2664.
SZld. at 2666.
53 1d. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2832
(1993)).
s The dissent is more fully stated in Holder v. Hall,
114 S.Ct. 2581, (1994), 1 REAL Digest 44, 45 (appor-
tionment plan is not a "standard, practice, or procedure"
that may be challenged under section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act) (Thomas, J., concurring).
sId. at 2659.
questions the very existence of remedial districting.
For Kennedy, the creation of majority-minority dis-
tricts gives rise to an equal protection claim and is
subject to strict scrutiny.
The Kennedy opinion is also indicative of the
Court's desire to ignore the importance of racial bloc
voting as a measure of vote polarization.56 It also
signifies an inability to handle a controversial, ra-
cially-charged issue. Nevertheless, the Court sim-
-' See Wasby, supra note 7, at 8. Justice Stevens is
noted as stating that "in the long run, there is no more
certainty that individual members of racial groups will
vote alike than that members of other identifiable groups
will do so." See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 88
(1981).
ply cannot wish away "the group nature of repre-
sentation itself, especially in a system of geographic
districting".5 7 To be sure, "[tihe concept of 'repre-
sentation' necessarily applies to groups: groups of
voters elect representatives, individual voters do
not."5 s
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Greer D. Saunders
57 See Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Funda-
mental Fairness in Representative Democracy, 120-21
(1994).
" Id. at 125 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 167 (1986)) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
